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ABSTRACT
Implementations of ARX ciphers are hoped to have some intrinsic
side channel resilience owing to the specific choice of cipher com-
ponents: modular addition (A), rotation (R) and exclusive-or (X).
Previous work has contributed to this understanding by developing
theory regarding the side channel resilience of components (pion-
eered by the early works of Prouff) as well as some more recent
practical investigations by Biryukov et al. that focused on light-
weight cipher constructions. We add to this work by specifically
studying ARX-boxes both mathematically as well as practically.
Our results show that previous works’ reliance on the simplistic
assumption that intermediates independently leak (their Hamming
weight) has led to the incorrect conclusion that the modular addi-
tion is necessarily the best target and that ARX constructions are
therefore harder to attack in practice: we show that on an ARM
M0, the best practical target is the exclusive or and attacks succeed
with only tens of traces.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Lightweight cipher constructions have drawn a lot of interest lately,
due to the boom of IoT applications and the NIST effort with regards
to lightweight ciphers. Among different approaches, the (long ex-
isting) ARX (modular addition, rotation, exclusive-or) paradigm is
particularly interesting due to recent results that indicate a “poten-
tial intrinsic resilience” against an important class of side channel
attacks:
The software implementations of the three ARX
designs we considered are characterized by a cer-
tain level of “intrinsic” resilience against CPA. ...
These features make ARX constructions excellent
candidates for the implementation of lightweight
block ciphers for the IoT. ([3], Conclusion)
One can argue that because the non-linear component in an
ARX design is given by the addition modulo 2n , it does not need
to be encoded as a table lookup. Therefore it is arguable that the
ARX instructions should take constant time on most platforms.
When considering cache timing attacks, the absence of tables is a
distinctive advantage, as stated in [12] and [8].
However, could there be indeed, such as alluded to in [3], an
intrinsic resilience against the power/EM attacks. Such intrinsic
resilience is greatly appealing to IoT designers as many resource
constrained devices cannot afford the overheads (additional random-
ness, memory) required by countermeasures against side channel
attacks.
We examine and challenge the idea of “intrinsic resilience” by
investigating mathematical properties of ARX-boxes as well as
conducting further real world side channel experiments on an im-
plementation on a typical target platform. Our results show that the
mathematical properties of the modular addition coupled with the
use of its within typical ARX designs can create additional obstacles
for an adversary because of the existence of indistinguishable keys
as well as the issue of enumeration size. However we do provide a
generic strategy of configuring a divide-and-conquer attack that
overcomes these problems.
Furthermore we find that our implementation of an attack dir-
ectly on the RX part of an ARX-box is very effective in practice; in
fact it is considerably more effective than any attack on the pre-
sumed “better” modular addition target (we use the word “better”
according to [3]). This finding may be surprising at first but it can be
rationalised by the leakage characteristics of the particular device
that we are using: it “amplifies” data dependent leakages if the
same or highly correlated data is manipulated in consecutive clock
cycles. This result might be particularly concerning as it contra-
dicts with those appear to hold generally (such as the conclusion in
[3] that the modular addition is a “better” target than the rotation
or exclusive-or). Such vulnerability could be easily overlooked in
practice.
Our work is motivated by a representative IoT scenario where
the application utilises an ARX cipher for a low cost solution, such
as standardised by the recent ISO/IEC DIS 19823-22 that regulates
the usage of SPECK[1] in RFID applications. We focus our experi-
ments on the popular ARM Cortex-M architecture, specifically a
NXP LPC1114F which is based on an ARM Cortex-M0 core. This ar-
chitecture features frequently in the IoT market, such as in the NXP
PN7462 family, Toshiba TMPM066FWUG and ST STM32F031F4,
etc.
This paper is structured as follows. We introduce notation and
background in Sect.2. Then we mathematically examine the exist-
ence of indistinguishable keys of modular addition in the context
of ARX designs, reflect on single-bit DPA and formulate an effi-
cient divide-and-conquer strategy for DPA in Sect.3. We conduct
practical experiments using correlation as a distinguisher (in accord-
ance with [3]) on the modular addition as well as the rotation/XOR
components of an ARX design (in Sect.5). We conclude in Sect.7.
1.1 Our Contributions
We consider this work as an extension to the existing literature
in terms of a thorough study against the perceived “intrinsic side
channel resilience” of ARX ciphers in a practical manner. In Sec-
tion 3 we present the impact to side channel analysis induced by
the mathematical properties of modular addition in ARX-Boxes.
We also propose a “bit-overlapping” strategy to overcome the par-
ticular issue of explosive enumeration space in DPA-style attacks
targeting the modular addition. In Section 4 we report a negative
result of a standard correlation attack targeting the modular addi-
tion that supports the conclusion drawn by [3], that is, the modular
addition, despite being (theoretically) the most effective target, pos-
sesses certain level of intrinsic resilience against DPA style attacks.
In contrast, Section 5 reports a successful attack on the XOR and
rotation part of an ARX-box which are generally considered inef-
fective targets in DPA attacks. We rationalised this result as the
consequence of a signal amplification effect induced by the naive
reference implementation. We consider this work as a standout
example that shows the mismatch between theory and practice. It
serves a precautionary note to cipher designers as well as to the
practitioners to question if theoretical assumptions are upheld by a
concrete device in practice.
1.2 Experimental Setup
We use the reference C implementation of SPARX-64/128 [5] to
instantiate the ARX cipher in our experiments. Our platform is an
LPC1114FN28 (ARM Cortex-M0) configured to 12MHz hosted by a
SCALE board [14]. All traces are collected on the full execution of
24 rounds of SPARX encryption on uniformly randomly generated
plaintext. A 10ms interleave is inserted between each execution of
encryption. The traces are measured by a Lecroy Wavepro 760Zi-A
configured to 500 MS/s. The correlation analysis is performed on
the raw traces without any preprocessing.
2 PRELIMINARIES
2.1 Notation
The notation [x] refers to the binary representation of an integer x :
x =
∑n−1
i=0 2
i [x]i , with [x]i denoting the i-th bit of [x].
We are mostly concerned with modular addition, logical rotation
(abbreviate as rotation) and exclusive-or (XOR) operations over Z2n .
We denote them as:
• x ⊞ y: (x + y) mod 2n
• x >> y: Right rotate x by y bits.
• x << y: Left rotate x byy bits which equates to x >> (n−y).
• x ⊕ y: Exclusive-or of x and y.
The flip function Fi (x) returns x with the i-th bit flipped:
Fi (x) = x ⊕ 2i .
The one’s complement of x (all bits are flipped) is denoted by x˜ :
x˜ = x ⊕ (2n − 1)
2.2 ARX Constructions: a generalised ARX
Sbox
The term “ARX cipher” refers to a family of ciphers that base their
round function on the simple combination of modular addition(⊞),
rotation(>>), and XOR(⊕). The idea of combining these instruc-
tions as a round function has been suggested as early as 1987 in the
block cipher FEAL[16]. The appeal of this construction is primarily
that we can choose n equal to the word size of a processor. The fact
that instructions for A, R, and X are typically available on small
embedded devices further enables excellent performance both with
respect to code size and energy consumption. This, plus the ad-
vantage of low memory consumption that naturally comes with
the absence of look up tables, explains why the ARX paradigm has
regained popularity in the context of resource constrained IoT scen-
arios. Recent examples for ARX constructions include Chacha20,
Figure 1: Generalised ARX-box Sα,β (x ,y)
Figure 2: SPARX
a well studied stream cipher that has been included in RFC [13],
the SKEIN hash function [6] which was a finalist of the SHA-3
competition, as well as the SPECK block cipher [1] proposed by
NSA. Here we specifically address the SPARX block cipher [5] as it
is the first instance that is provably secure against differential and
linear cryptanalysis [5] (justifying the security of ARX ciphers is
far more difficult due to its lack of S-Box and only uses modular
addition for non-linear layer [4]).
The rotations, which are based on known constants, are ne-
cessary for the cryptanalytical resilience of ARX ciphers. For an
adversary who uses side channels to gain additional information
about intermediate variables, they can however be easily incorpor-
ated into the attack strategy and have no whatsoever impact. Hence
in this paper we focus (without loss of generality) on a generalised
ARX-box that omits the rotation. We thus are defining a generalised
ARX-box as:
s = Sα,β (x ,y) = (x ⊕ α)⊞ (y ⊕ β). (1)
In (1), the tuple (x ,y) consists of the known inputs, and the tuple
(α , β) consists of the secret keys. All variables are in the field Z2n .
Figure 1 presents the circuit that is equivalent to (1).
We argue 1 to be general because typical ARX-boxes can be
reduced to this form (we provide two concrete examples in the
following).
Example 2.1. In SPARX(Figure 2), the subkeys are first XOR-ed
with two blocks of plaintext, then the left share is rotated, then
the modular addition takes place. Denote the left and right half
plaintext in Figure 2 as pL and pR and the subkeys as kL and kR ,
the modular sum s is:
s = ((pL ⊕ kL) >> 7)⊞ (pR ⊕ kR )
= ((pL >> 7) ⊕ (kL >> 7))⊞ (pR ⊕ kR ) (2)
To reduce from (2) to (1), we simply define:
x = pL >> 7
α = kL >> 7
y = pR
β = kR
(3)
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Example 2.2. SKEIN combines the plaintext and key, denoted
as p and k , by directly adding them together. The modular sum is
therefore:
s = p ⊞ k (4)
In this case, the generalise ARX-box is instantiated by setting:
x = p
α = 0
y = 0
β = k
2.3 Side Channel Attacks on ARX Ciphers
We briefly recall the assumptions and procedure of a non-profiled
standard DPA style attack, followed by reflecting on implementa-
tion options and measures of success.
DPA procedure. The adversary first collects a set of leakage traces
T = {t1, t2, . . . } with known plaintexts X = {x1,x2, . . . } (the
device uses a fixed known algorithm, and a fixed but unknown
key that is comprised of subkeys k∗ that the attack extracts). For
simplicity of notation we drop the superscript that indexes traces,
and we refrain from introducing notation to index into individual
points in traces.
Traces are assumed to be noisy (Gaussian additive noise e) and
have multiple points which are treated independently in a standard
DPA style attack: T = {t i : t = MD (Fk∗ (x i )) + ei }. Thus the
adversary will apply to following procedure to each trace point
independently.
The adversary selects a target intermediate v = Fk (x) corres-
ponding to some step F that is executed during the cryptographic
algorithm, and translates this to a leakage value using a predicted
leakage model L (e.g. L is typically the Hamming weight or distance,
or the value of a single bit of v). A divide-and-conquer strategy en-
ables to extract information about a subkey using a Distinguisher D
suitable for the selected leakage model (e.g. correlation for models
with more than two classes as outcomes, or a t-test for purely binary
models). This is done by the adversary by computing a distinguish-
ing score for each subkey candidate (the function L is applied over
all inputs in X and assuming a specific value of k , to produce a set
of hypothetical leakage values Lk ): Dk = D(T, Lk ).
If all adversarial assumptions hold (in particular the leakage
model L is sufficiently close to the true device leakage) the correct
key can be identified as the one with the highest distinguishing
score.
Instantiation options. There are several options in instantiating an
attack, in regards to different target intermediate v (and hence
target function F ), different prediction model L and different dis-
tinguisher D. The most commonly instantiated attacks are single
bit DPA [10] and Correlation Power Analysis (CPA)[10]. Single bit
DPA targets a single bit intermediate v , e.g. a selected bit of an
S-Box output, with identity function L(v) = v as prediction. The
commonly used distinguishers for single bit DPA include Difference
of Means, Distance of Means and Generalised Maximum-Likelihood
Testing[10]. In comparison, correlation attacks can use target inter-
mediates v of multiple bits, e.g. the full output of an S-Box, and the
Hamming weight (HW) prediction of leakage L(v) = HW (v) which
has practically been proven effective in many cases [10][18], to-
gether with the absolutes value of Pearson’s correlation coefficients
as the distinguisher D.
Notably, the selection of target intermediate v dominates the
key enumeration space and hence the computational and space
complexity in launching an attack. In case of our generalised ARX-
box as in Figure 1, this implies that when selecting v as all bits
of the n-bit modular sum, the adversary is required to enumerate
over a space size of 22n for both α and β which could be costly as n
increases. We provide more details of this subject later in Sect.3.3.
Effectiveness. The effectiveness of a DPA style attack is commonly
evaluated by the number of traces required to recover the key. It is
generally understood that completely linear targets such as the XOR
and rotation operations are difficult to attack with DPA: attacks
on such targets require many more traces than attacks on highly
non-linear target functions, and even with very large numbers of
leakages there remains some keys that cannot be distinguished
from each other [15]. This statement is further supported by [3]
where the authors reported the difficulties of independent correla-
tion attacks using HW predictions against the XOR and rotation
instructions. The study [3] quantified the difficulty of attacking
different instructions utilised in ARX ciphers in terms of Pearson’s
correlation with HWprediction on an AVR processor and concluded
that even the most effective target, which is the only non-linear
operation, i.e., modular addition, does not seem effective enough
to mount a practical attack. The idea that attacking a XOR is ne-
cessarily more difficult than attacking a modular addition has been
picked up independently also here:
... In this case (ARX), side-channel analysis is still
possible but the XOR or modular addition selec-
tion functions are less efficient than for the Sbox
case. Moreover, it has been theoretically proven
that the XOR selection function is less efficient
that the modular addition operations. (Section
2.2, [2])
Attacking ARX. To date, there have been minimal successful side
channel attacks on ARX ciphers under a similar setup. The most
significant result to our knowledge is [18], which demonstrated
that it is possible to improve on straightforward DPA style attacks
when targeting the modular addition in SKEIN [6] on a 32 bit
ARM Cortex-M3 processor. In [18], the authors observed that the
symmetrical structure of modular addition eventually results into a
pair of correlation peaks; therefore the performance of an attack
can be improved by testing pairs of correlations rather than a single
correlation. However, attacks like [18] requires one of the adders
to be known to the adversary. It also faces the practical problem
that the number of key hypotheses tested via the target function
increases exponentially with the operand size. For example, in the
case of a 32-bit modern processor such as an ARM M0, performing
a DPA style attack requires the adversary to enumerate both 32-bits
adders which has a space complexity of 264. To solve this issue,
[18] assumes a stronger adversary that is capable of choosing the
plaintext to be encrypted, in comparison to a classic DPA setting
where the DPA adversary only passively collect traces. It has also
been shown possible that straight forward DPA could succeed on 8
3
bit and 16 bit microcontrollers targeting the writing of the output
of key XOR in [7].
3 MATHEMATICAL EXPLORATION OF THE
PROPERTIES OF MODULAR ADDITION AS
A DPA TARGET
Considering the fact that modular addition is the only non-linear
operation in an ARX-box, it is naturally the primary target for DPA
attacks as explained by [3]. However, off-the shelf DPA strategies
turn out to be problematic because of the specific nature of modular
addition as we now explain in detail.
3.1 Indistinguishable Keys
The first observation is that it is impossible to achieve a first order
key recovery exploiting only the leakage of the modular sum, as
explained by Proposition 3.1.
Proposition 3.1. Let (α , β) be the correct key for an ARX-box.
There is always another key (α ′, β ′) , (α , β), such that:
∀(x ,y) : Sα,β (x ,y) ≡ Sα ′,β ′(x ,y)( mod 2n ) (5)
Proof. Let {
α ′ = Fn−1(α)
β ′ = Fn−1(β) (6)
For arbitrary (x ,y), it follows that{
Sα,β (x ,y) = (x ⊕ α)⊞ (y ⊕ β)
Sα ′,β ′(x ,y) = (x ⊕ Fn−1(α))⊞ (y ⊕ Fn−1(β)) (7)
Note that (x ⊕ α) and (x ⊕ α ′) only differs at the MSB, and the
same applies to (y ⊕ β) and (y ⊕ β ′). Hence:{(x ⊕ α) = (x ⊕ α ′) ± 2n−1
(y ⊕ β) = (y ⊕ β ′) ± 2n−1 (8)
Therefore:
Sα,β (x ,y) − Sα ′,β ′(x ,y) ≡ ±2n−1 ± 2n−1( mod 2n ) (9)
Note that:
− 2n ≡ 0 ≡ 2n ( mod 2n ) (10)
Therefore
Sα,β (x ,y) ≡ Sα ′,β ′(x ,y)( mod 2n ) (11)
□ □
Proposition 3.1 implies that for a correct key (α , β), an incor-
rect key (α ′, β ′) always results in identical modular sums and con-
sequently identical leakage distributions; therefore they cannot be
distinguished from each other in any DPA style attack.
3.2 Ineffective Single Bit DPA
Our next observation is that single bit DPA is ineffective against
modular addition. Observe that the i-bit of the modular sum [s]i
can be represented as:
[s]i = ([x]i ⊕ [α]i )⊞ ([y]i ⊕ [β]i )+ci = [x]i ⊕ [α]i ⊕ [y]i ⊕ [β]i ⊕ci
(12)
where ci denotes the carry bit from adding the previous bits and spe-
cifically c0 = 0. (12) implies that single bit key guesses ([α]i , [β]i )
and ([˜α]i , [˜β]i ) are equivalent and thus cannot be distinguished
from each other in a DPA attack. Consequently, applying a single
bit DPA on each bit of s only recovers α ⊕ β and thus only reduces
the key space from 22n to 2n , which might still be costly in practice.
3.3 The Enumeration Space and
Divide-and-Conquer
When single bit DPA is not viable as we explained in Sect. 3.2, an
adversary has to attack multiple bits simultaneously. Recall that
determining s requires the adversary to enumerate both α and β
simultaneously, which for n-bit operands quickly becomes very
costly (e.g. consider SPARX [5] its 16 bit operands implies 232 keys
need to be enumerated).
Alternatively, a general solution to reduce the key enumeration
space is a divide-and-conquer strategy that recovers (α , β) chunk-
wise. Denote by sc ,αc , βc , xc , yc the l-bits chunks starting from the
i-th bit of s , α , β , x , y respectively and their corresponding previous
bits as sp , αp , βp , xp and yp . Observe that:
sc = (xc ⊕ αc )⊞ (yc ⊕ βc )⊞ ci (13)
where ci , the carry bit from adding the previous bits, can be ex-
pressed as:
ci =
{
0 if (xp ⊕ αp ) + (yp ⊕ βp ) < 2i
1 otherwise
(14)
and specifically c0 = 0.
(13) indeed suggests a naive approach of divide-and-conquer by
recursively recovering the key bits from LSB to MSB. However, it
can be easily shown that Proposition 3.1 also applies in this case.
Therefore, in such a straightforward divide-and-conquer approach,
all equivalent keys recovered in each chunk will have to be carried
over into the next chunk, resulting in a key space that exponentially
explodes with the number of chunks for each iteration.
Reviewing Proposition 3.1, we notice that the equivalent keys
only differ at their MSBs; thus, attacking each chunk indeed recov-
ers the unique lower l − 1 bits of (αc , βc ). Exploiting this feature, by
dropping the MSBs of (αc , βc ) and overlapping them with the LSBs
of the next chunk, one can avoid equivalent keys and uniquely
recover the lower order of l − i bits (αc , βc ), except for the last
chunk where there is no next chunk to be overlapped. Applying
this overlapping method, we can reduce the resulting key space in
a divide-and-conquer attack to 2.
4 CORRELATION ATTACKS AGAINST
MODULAR ADDITION
With the observations of Sect. 3 in mind, we implemented a classic
correlation attack using Pearson’s correlation with HW predictions
against the modular addition in accordance to [3]. We note that the
optimisation proposed in [18] is not an option in our generalised
ARX-box as it requires the knowledge of one of the adders, while
both are unknown in our case. Our implementation targets the
lowest 4 bits for a practical key enumeration space (28) and 2 pairs
of equivalent key chunks are expected at the end of this attack as
explained by Proposition 3.1. This 4-bit attack can be extended to
all 16 bits of (α , β) as we explained in Section 3.3.
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Figure 3: Correlations for SPARX modular addition using
500 simulated traces. Difference in correlation between the
correct key guess and the best among the others showed in
dash line.
Simulation. We first applied the attack on traces simulated as the
HW of s with additive Gaussian noise at an SNR setting of 21. The
attack successfully recovered the key using 500 traces as we show in
Figure 3a. The indistinguishable key was also observed as expected
by Proposition 3.1. In addition, the simulated traces are showing
multiple significant correlations on several incorrect key candidates.
This can be explained by the weakly non-linear nature of modular
addition. In general, consider a simplified modular addition
x ⊞ k = z
Flipping the higher bits of k leaves the lower order bits of the sum
z unchanged. For instance, in an extreme case, flipping the MSB of
k (or x) is a linear operation, because:
k ′ = k ⊕ 2n−1 =⇒ (x ⊞ k) ⊕ (x ⊞ k ′) = 2n−1
that is, only the MSB of z is flipped in response.
In terms of DPA attacks, this implies that, given a set of plaintexts
and a number of key guesses including k ′ as just described, the
intermediate values related to the sum z are identical in most bits.
Consequently, for typical linear leakage models, their resulting
hypothetical leakages will be very close, lowering the difference in
correlation between the correct key guess and “similar” incorrect
key guesses.
The observation is then supported by our further simulations
with SNR decreased to 2−3. The attack failed with the same amount
of traces, as showed in Figure 3b. Even though the correct key(s)
still showed a significant correlation, an incorrect key candidate(s)
showed an even higher correlation. Comparing Figure 3a to Fig-
ure 3b, we can see the difference in correlation between the correct
key and the best among the others decreased significantly as we
anticipated.
Real attack. We carried the same experiments out using real traces
collected on the ARM Cortex-M0 executing SPARX-64/128 with the
reference C implementation [17]. The SNR of this device, estimated
by the method proposed in [9], is 2.823 for all 16 bits of s and 0.043
for the 4 targeted bits. Using sample sets of 2000 traces, certain
points on the traces were found significantly correlating to our
prediction of leakage under the correct key guess. Yet, the attacks
failed due to incorrect keys are yielding at even higher correlations,
reflecting the results in the above simulations.
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Figure 5: Correlation attack against XOR and rotation on
real traces
To further investigate the impact of the number of traces to the
attack, we extracted the time points with the highest correlation
to the correct key. We plotted the evolution of correlations (taking
the average of 20 repeated experiments) of all key candidates in
Figure 4. It suggests that the correlations indeed stabilise within
a few hundred of traces; and hence more traces will not make the
attack successful.
From a practical aspect, themismatch between the device leakage
model and the usedHWmodel as the adversarial powermodel could
be another potential cause for the failure of the attack. However,
in a non-profiling scenario, the adversary is unable to acquire an
accurate prediction model for the correlation attack and thus has
to rely on a classic model, typically the HW, which we have shown
to be ineffective in our experiments. Therefore we consider our
results so far as evidence of the claimed “intrinsic resilience” of
ARX ciphers stated in [3].
5 CORRELATION ATTACKS AGAINST
ROTATION AND XOR
We further extended our experiments to the assumed to be more
“difficult” targets in ARX-boxes described in [3], which are the
linear operations (XOR and rotation). For a fair comparison with
the experiments in Sect.4 in terms of key space, we selected the
target intermediate to be the 8 lower-order bits of (x ⊕α) of SPARX.
Note that rotation has no effect in changing the HW of the operand;
hence XOR and rotation share the same predicted leakage in the
HW model.
5
The correlation attack is again implemented with HW predic-
tions and applied to the same real traces collected during the ex-
periments of Sect.4. To our initial surprise, the result contradicts
those reported by [3]. The key was successfully recovered with a
low number of traces (Figure 5). The symmetry in Figure 5a is due
to the fact that:
HW (x˜ ⊕ α) = HW (x ⊕ α) = n − HW (x ⊕ α) (15)
where n = 8 is the size of the target intermediate in bits. (15)
implies that complemented keys α and α˜ result in HW leakage
predictions complemented modulo n and thus the same absolute
value of correlation. We also present the evolution of correlations
(taken over 20 repeat experiments) at point of highest correlation
over different number of traces in Figure 5b. The result suggests
that the correlation of the correct key reaches a clear distinction
against others for only tens of traces on this device.
What is then the reason that this practical result seemingly con-
tradicts the existing theory? We argue that an explanation can be
found when challenging an (unexamined) assumption in previous
work. This assumption is omnipresent both in theoretical papers
like [15] as well in practical results [3]: it is the assumption that
devices leak the Hamming weight of just one operand irrespective
of the previous (or next) data to be processed. The device which we
are using, a completely standard ARM M0, by large fits this leakage
model. A very detailed exploration of its leakage characteristics was
recently published as a (side result) in [11]. Their work derived not
only instruction-level leakage models, but it also hinted towards
a “signal amplification” effect. This effect occurs when consecut-
ive instructions operate on the data: latter instructions exhibit a
considerably stronger signal than earlier instructions (on the same
data). Because of this effect, the attack on the exclusive-or benefits
from a significantly better signal-to-noise ratio, and therefore does
perform much better in practice than the attack on the modular
addition.
To check if our suspicion was correct, we examined the code
that implements the ARX-box in our experiments, see Figure 6a
(this is the SPARX reference implementation). Since rotation is not
supported in standard C, it is naturally implemented as a combina-
tion of arithmetic shift and OR operations as in the macro ROTL
of Figure 6a. When compiled with ARM toolchain arm-none-eabi
6.3.1, it is translated into the following assembly1 (Figure 6b). We
specifically marked the operands that are potentially leaking our
intended leakage HW (x ⊕ α) in Figure 6b. Clearly consecutive in-
structions are indeed invoking operands containing the targeted
leakage; therefore the signal amplification occurs when this code is
executed, making the instructions very vulnerable against a DPA
attack. Note that the native rotation instructions cannot be directly
invoked to implement the ARX-box when the word sizes are not
matched, for example in this case where M0 has only the 32bits
ROR instruction whilst SPARX requires 16bits rotations. To handle
this, software implementations inevitably need to pad the register
before rotation. The padding again results into consecutive instruc-
tions over the same operands; thus produces an amplified leakage
consequently.
1The functions and macros are inlined by the compiler.
//Rotate left for 16 bit registers.
#define ROTL(x,n) (((x)<<n)|((x)>>(16-(n))))
static void A(uint16_t * l, uint16_t * r)
{
(*l) = ROTL((*l), 9);
(*l) += (*r);
(*r) = ROTL((*r), 2);
(*r) ^= (*l);
}
static void sparx_encrypt(uint16_t * x,
uint16_t k[][2 * ROUNDS_PER_STEPS])
{
//Unrelated code omitted.
//Key XOR.
x[2 * b] ^= k[N_BRANCHES * s + b][2 * r];
x[2 * b + 1] ^= k[N_BRANCHES * s + b][2 * r + 1];
//Rotation and Addition.
A(x + 2 * b, x + 2 * b + 1);
}
(a) Reference C implementation of SPARX [17]
@Key XOR
eors r1, r2
@Rotation
lsrs r2, r1, #7
lsls r1, r1, #9
orrs r1, r2
@Modular addition
adds r1, r0, r2
(b) Assembly of SPARX ARX-box. Operands with potential leakage
HW (x ⊕ α )marked in bold underline
Figure 6: Code fragments of reference SPARX implementa-
tion
6 COMPARING EXPERIMENTS ON M3
For comparison, we further conducted the same experiments on a
different ARM Cortex-M3 platform instantiated by NXP LPC1313F,
using the same reference C implementation shown in Figure 6a.
Similar results were observed as we show in Figure 7. The cor-
relation attack targetting the RX part succeeded within tens of
traces, whereas for addition it failed with up to 20000 traces due to
false positives on other key candidates, as shown in Figure 7a and
Figure 7b respectively.
The relevant assemblies (Figure 8) changed as we switched the
platform from M0 to M32. Similar to Figure 6b, the 16bits rotation
on a 32bits platform was again implemented as consecutive instruc-
tions manipulating the same operands with potentially the same
2Instruction set also switched from Thumb to ARM.
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Figure 7: Evolution of correlationswith different target func-
tion on M3
<A>:
ldrh r2, [r0, #0]
@Rotation
lsrs r3, r2, #7
orr.w r3, r3, r2, lsl #9
uxth r3, r3
strh r3, [r0, #0]
ldrh r2, [r1, #0]
@Modular Addition
add r3, r2
strh r3, [r0, #0]
...
<sparx_encrypt>:
@Key XOR
eors r3, r1
...
strh r3, [r6, #2]
mov r1, r2
str r2, [sp, #4]
@Invoke ARX-Box
bl 88 <A>
cmp.w r8, #12
ldr r2, [sp, #4]
...
Figure 8: Assembly of SPARX ARX-Box on M3. Operands
with potential leakage HW (x ⊕ α)marked in bold underline
leakage HW (x ⊕ α). Further more, due to key addition being done
by the outer function, an additional load instruction (ldrh) was
performed beforehand which we expect to further amplifies the
leakage, as memory instructions are reportedly more vulnerable
against correlation attacks according to [3] and [11]. On the other
hand, even though the modular sum has been additionally written
back into the memory by a store instruction (strh), the leakage
was not yet enough to recover the correct key in a straightforward
correlation attack.
7 SUMMARY
This work examines the intuition that ARX ciphers have intrinsic
resilience against side channel attacks because of the absence of
strong S-Boxes.
We first show and discuss that an adversary targeting the “stronger”
modular addition must deal with the issues of indistinguishable
keys and enumeration size. However we provide a mitigation by
utilising a bit-overlapping trick, which we proposed. We further-
more ran attacks (simulated and real using a very popular ARM
M0 architecture) on the modular addition which show that results
from previous work apply also to the settings that we chose.
However we did not stop there and also investigated attacks
on the XOR and rotation operations. Despite the fact that these
operations are linear and thus are generally considered “bad” targets
in side channel attacks, we found they could be easily broken in a
straightforward correlation attack on real traces. In fact they were
“better” targets than the modular addition. Investigating the source
code suggested that the vulnerability is most likely caused by a
signal amplification effect that is typical for our target platforms.
This shows that previous work, which is based on the assumption
that devices purely leak the Hamming weight of an intermediate
value, is already too simplistic for platforms such as an M0 or an
M3. Therefore seemingly device independent conclusions (such as
that the modular addition is a better target than an exclusive or)
have to be treated with a degree of scepticism.
In conclusion, we argue that the “intrinsic resilience against side
channel attacks” of ARX ciphers should not be taken for granted
and implementing robust countermeasures is a must.
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